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Fernan: Search and Seizures

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: CONSTITUTIONALLY
PROTECTED OR DISCRETIONARY POLICE WORK?
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Kennebrew1
(decided May 29, 2013)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent times, a debate has stirred over whether the New
York Police Department’s (“NYPD”) “stop and frisk” practices are
unconstitutional.2 The Supreme Court of the United States has held
that the Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable search and
seizure are so vital that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded.”3 The Fourth Amendment raises great controversies concerning confrontations between police and criminal suspects,
especially when individuals are searched without a warrant. 4 This
case note will address the standards police are supposed to uphold
when conducting a warrantless search and seizure in the field. More
specifically, this case note will explore the issues raised in People v.
Kennebrew—which circumstances may yield a reasonable suspicion
that a citizen poses a danger to a police officer and/or the general
public, subsequently permitting a “stop and frisk.” In addition to the
use of questionable standards in justifying reasonable suspicion, police practices have resulted in concrete evidence of racial profiling.5
1

965 N.Y.S.2d 622 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013).
See generally Emily J. Sack, Police Approaches and Inquiries on the Streets of New
York: The Aftermath of People v. De Bour, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 512 (1991) (exploring the increased protections for New York citizens since New York’s landmark decision in People v.
De Bour and the conflicting interests between prevention of crime by the police and Fourth
Amendment protections).
3
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 11 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891)).
4
Id. at 4.
5
Sack, supra note 2, at 539 (stating that police frequently rely on race as a factor to iden2
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Case law suggests that citizens ought to enjoy strict enforcement of
the protections under the Fourth Amendment; however, evidence of
unconstitutional police practices and, more specifically, the NYPD’s
‘stop and frisk policy’ suggests otherwise.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF PEOPLE V. KENNEBREW

While driving through a neighborhood in which there were
numerous complaints of drug activity, three police officers noticed
the defendant standing on a street corner with multiple cigarettes in
his hand and subsequently approached him in their vehicle.6 As the
defendant began to walk in the opposite direction, the officers exited
the car, called out to him, and approached him on foot.7 One officer
asked the defendant for his name, identification, and whether he was
selling cigarettes.8 The defendant identified himself, explained his
reasoning for standing on the street corner, and denied selling cigarettes.9 Then, the officer asked the defendant whether he was in a
gang because the defendant’s clothes suggested gang affiliation.10
The defendant admitted to being in a gang, but when he was asked
whether he had a gun on his person, the defendant did not answer.11
The police then placed the defendant against the wall, conducted a
pat-down search, and recovered a handgun from his person.12 The
defendant stated, “I am going to be in a lot of trouble for this.” 13 The
officers explained that they noticed a bulge on the defendant’s waistband, under his clothing, as their reason for conducting the patdown.14
A.

The Court’s Analysis of People v. Kennebrew

The defendant moved to suppress his statement and the physitify suspects and “the use of race creates great potential for police abuse, leading to discriminatory intrusions which the fourth amendment was designed to prevent.”).
6
Kennebrew, 965 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 624 (stating that defendant was wearing red and black beads and had a teardrop
tattoo below his eye).
11
Kennebrew, 965 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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cal evidence against him.15 That motion was granted by the Queens
County Supreme Court and affirmed by the Appellate Division,
which held that the police officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to
justify a stop and frisk.16
The Appellate Division primarily relied on the four-level test
to evaluate the constitutionality of the encounter between defendant
and the police, which was delineated by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. De Bour.17 The test provides that:
[(1)] The minimal intrusion of approaching to request
information is permissible when there is some objective credible reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality. [(2)] The next degree, the
common-law right of inquiry, is activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits
a somewhat greater intrusion in that a policeman is entitled to interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary
to gain explanatory information, but short of a forcible
seizure . . . [(3)] the authority to frisk if the officer
reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical injury by virtue of the detainee being armed. [(4)] Finally a police officer may arrest and take into custody
a person when he has probable cause to believe that
person has committed a crime, or offense in his presence.18
In Kennebrew, the court’s primary concern was the third level of police intrusion because the police officers conducted a “frisk.” 19 The
court ultimately held that it was not reasonable for the officers to suspect that they were in danger of physical injury.20 The prosecution
contended that the pat-down was justified because of the defendant’s
failure to answer the officers’ inquiry about the defendant possessing
a gun and the bulge they noticed in the defendant’s waistband.21 The
15

Id.
Kennebrew, 965 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
17
People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976) (internal citations omitted).
18
Id. at 571-72; see also People v. Moore, 847 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (N.Y. 2006) (“Innocuous behavior alone will not generate a founded or reasonable suspicion that a crime is at
hand.”).
19
Kennebrew, 965 N.Y.S.2d at 625.
20
Id.
21
Id.
16
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court disagreed, relying on People v. Stevenson.22 In Stevenson, the
court explained that an unidentifiable bulge can be interpreted ambiguously; persons with a bulge in their waistband is just as likely to
be innocent as guilty.23 Additionally, the court in Stevenson held that
a criminal suspect has the right to refuse to answer a police officer’s
question.24 This right is inherent in the nature of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.25
Based on the above referenced case law and the lack of factual evidence to illustrate that the officers reasonably believed to be in
danger from defendant’s actions, the Appellate Division properly
suppressed the evidence obtained against defendant.
III.

UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS
A.

United States Supreme Court

In 1968, the Supreme Court delivered the landmark decision
of Terry v. Ohio,26 which explored whether a search and seizure in
the field of police work is reasonable.27 The Court defined precisely
what constitutes both a “search” and a “seizure” and, subsequently,
when there are appropriate circumstances for a police officer to perform both without a search warrant.28 The Court also alluded to the
fact that it is imperative to recognize that the performance of a search
and seizure in public is a major confrontation between protections
under the Fourth Amendment and the safety of police officers and the
general public.29 Ultimately, the Court emphasized that a two-part
responsibility exists between police officers and the courts when considering the search and seizure of private citizens.30 With regard to
police officers, there “is a severe requirement of specific justification

22

779 N.Y.S.2d 498 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2004).
Id. at 499.
24
Id.
25
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26
Terry, 392 U.S. at 4.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 10-12.
29
Id. at 10-15 (acknowledging that while public safety and prevention of crime are a legitimate interest, there must be adequate judicial review to balance these interests against
Fourth Amendment protections in order to sustain judicial integrity and remain mindful of
the growing distrust between law enforcement and minority groups).
30
Id. at 11-13.
23
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for any intrusion upon protected personal security.”31 The Court further explained that there is required judicial integrity—“a highly developed system of judicial controls to enforce upon the agents of the
State the commands of the Constitution.”32 In reaching its decision,
the Court heavily relied on the language of the Fourth Amendment.33
The Court held that an analysis of Fourth Amendment protection is necessary when a person has been either searched or seized.34
“[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person . . . [and a search
is] a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person’s clothing.”35 Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead; for
example, the Second Circuit has emphasized that “[a] seizure occurs
when (1) a person obeys a police officer’s order to stop or (2) a person that does not submit to an officer’s show of authority is physically restrained.”36 The Court in Terry emphasized that the police must
obtain a warrant to conduct a search and seizure whenever it is practicable.37 Furthermore, a stop may be reasonable, but in order to conduct a permissible frisk, there must be a suspicion of violence. 38 Essentially, the Court limited the scope of frisk to situations in which
the intrusion is reasonably believed to yield some kind of weapon or
instrument that can be used to harm the police officer.39 The issue
before the Court in Terry, however, dealt with situations where a police officer reasonably believed he or she was in imminent danger.40
The Court held that whether the police officer reasonably believed he
or she was in reasonable danger should be judged by an objective
standard.41 This standard is “whether a reasonably prudent man in
the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or

31

Terry, 392 U.S. at 11.
Id.
33
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
34
Id. at 9.
35
Id. at 16.
36
United States v. Simmons, 560 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2009).
37
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
38
Id. at 33 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39
Id. at 29 (majority opinion).
40
Id. at 20.
41
Id. at 21.
32
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that of others was in danger.”42 The Court further stressed that “good
faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough . . . [because if
this were the case] the protections of the Fourth Amendment
would . . . [be] in the discretion of the police.”43
B.

United States Court of Appeals

The task of defining the scope of “reasonable suspicion” was
further explored by the Second Circuit in United States v. Freeman.44
In Freeman, a NYPD dispatcher received two calls from an unidentified caller regarding a Hispanic male with a gun, who was wearing a
black hat and a white t-shirt, but the dispatcher was unable to confirm
whether the 911 caller actually saw a firearm.45 Two officers, Joseph
Walsh and Ryan Conroy, responded to the call from about eight
blocks away.46 As the officers approached the location, the dispatcher notified them that a new call came in, describing the suspect as a
black male wearing a white du-rag, black hat, and a long white tshirt.47 Upon surveying the area, the officers noticed Joseph Freeman
walking and observed that he fit the most recent description of the
suspect.48 The officers waited for Freeman to approach their vehicle,
and once he was in close proximity, Conroy exited the vehicle and
attempted to talk to Freeman.49 Freeman ignored Conroy and continued walking, so Conroy grabbed Freeman’s elbow.50 Freeman broke
Conroy’s grasp and continued walking away and, subsequently,
Walsh exited the vehicle and grabbed Freeman’s elbow.51 Once
Freeman shrugged off Walsh, Walsh grabbed Freeman around the
waist and eventually tripped him to the ground.52 After a short struggle, and with the help of two additional officers who arrived at the
scene, Freeman was handcuffed, and a gun was found in his waist-

42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
Id. at 22 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
735 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id. at 95
Id.
Freeman, 735 F.3d at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/11

6

Fernan: Search and Seizures

2014]

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

1059

band.53 The officers admitted that Freeman never ran off or tried to
flee.54
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed whether the
evidence against Freeman should have been suppressed due to a lack
of reasonable suspicion.55 The court referred to the holding in United
States v. Bayless56 to emphasize that reasonable suspicion is not
based on an “inchoate suspicion or mere hunch,” but rather “specific
and articulable facts.”57 Also, the court held that the only facts relevant to justify a stop and frisk are those facts that preceded the actual
stop.58 Thus, the court determined when the officer exercised control
to restrain Freeman’s liberty and concluded that Freeman was
stopped when Walsh restrained him around his waist.59 After determining when the stop occurred, the court had to consider the preceding evidence, which included the 911 call, Freeman’s match to the
description, and Freeman’s refusal to answer or stop for the officers’
inquiries.60 The court held that anonymous tips alone are insufficient
to justify reasonable suspicion for a valid stop.61 Also, the court determined that Freeman had a right to refuse the officers’ inquiries
and, by the officers’ admission, his actions were not suspicious because he did not attempt to flee.62 The court took a rigid stance of defining the need to correctly define reasonable suspicion instead of al53

Id.
Freeman, 735 F.3d at 95.
55
Id. (reviewing legal decisions de novo, but reviewing findings of fact for clear error
from the district court’s conviction of a felon in possession with a firearm).
56
201 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that reasonable suspicion is judged against an objective standard and, therefore, subjective intentions or motives are irrelevant).
57
Freeman, 735 F.3d at 96 (quoting Bayless, 201 F.3d at 132-33).
58
Id.
59
Id. (rejecting the government’s argument that a stop only occurred once the officers put
handcuffs on the suspect).
60
Id. at 97 (noting that the recovered gun or any suspicious movements by Freeman were
irrelevant in determining whether the officers had reasonable suspicion at the time of the initial stop).
61
Id. at 98; see Florida v. J.L, 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (holding that even an anonymous
tip that is proven to be completely accurate in its location and description of the suspect is
insufficient to justify a stop); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (vacating structured tests for probable caused and holding that a “totality of the circumstances”
approach on a case-by-case basis will better serve both the public and private interests).
62
Freeman, 735 F.3d at 102. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“when
an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. And any refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a
detention or seizure.”).
54
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lowing governmental abuse.63 Relying on Freeman, the court in
Bayless explained that “district court[s] must not merely defer to [a]
police officer’s judgment.”64 Instead, courts should focus on how a
reasonable officer, an officer who has been trained in and has
knowledge of the applicable law, should have acted in that situation.65 In sum, the corroborated circumstances must provide sufficient grounds for the officer to suspect the actual legal wrongdoing.66
IV.

NEW YORK JUDICIAL HISTORY
A.

Evaluating a Justifiable Frisk

In People v. De Bour,67 the New York Court of Appeals developed a four-level test to evaluate police conduct when faced with a
street encounter with a suspected criminal.68 To determine the constitutionality of a frisk conducted by a police officer, a level-three intrusion must be examined.69 In De Bour, while police officers patrolled
an empty street after midnight, they saw a man, the defendant, walking towards them on the same side of the sidewalk.70 When the defendant was within thirty or forty feet of the officers, he crossed the
street and the police officers did the same.71 When the officers
reached the defendant, they asked him what he was doing, and the defendant nervously responded that he was going to a friend’s house.72
The officers then asked the defendant for identification, but the de63

Freeman, 735 F.3d at 102 (explaining that reasonable suspicion does not mean simply
accepting whatever circumstances are offered by the government as necessarily demonstrating sufficient grounds to suspect legal wrongdoing).
64
Bayless, 201 F.3d at 133 (clarifying that courts must adhere to the objective standard
applied as a reasonable officer when assessing such factors).
65
Simms v. Village of Albion, 115 F.3d 1098, 1106 (2d Cir. 1997).
66
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (clarifying that although certain acts
may be deemed innocent when evaluated separately, the factors can raise a reasonable suspicion when corroborated and judged against a “reasonable officer” standard).
67
352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976).
68
Id. at 571-72.
69
John H. Wilson, Legal Standards for Police Interaction with the Public, N.Y.L.J. (September 23, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=
1202620154543&thepage=2 (connecting the holding in De Bour with the holding in Terry to
show that a level-three intrusion from the decision in De Bour is equivalent to what the
Court determined to be a “stop” in Terry).
70
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 565.
71
Id.
72
Id.
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fendant had none.73 One officer noticed a slight bulge in the defendant’s jacket and asked him to unzip his jacket.74 The defendant complied, and the officers observed and recovered a loaded revolver from
defendant’s waistband and placed him under arrest.75 The court held
that this intrusion was reasonable under the circumstances because
the intrusion was minimal and limited in scope.76 The evidence may
have been suppressed if the police forcefully detained the defendant
before actually seeing the revolver; however, the police were justified
in their initial inquiry because of the time, place, and defendant’s
suspicious actions of crossing the street.77 Lastly, defendant voluntarily revealed his weapon when he unzipped his jacket, which
showed minimal intrusion and justified the frisk and ensuing arrest.78
B.

Case Law Defining Reasonable Suspicion

In People v. Shuler,79 the court provided a very detailed definition of what constitutes “reasonable suspicion” when a police officer is contemplating whether to detain a suspect.80 On its face, reasonable suspicion involves “that quantum of knowledge sufficient to
induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious person under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand.”81 The court in Schuler
held that reasonable suspicion involves corroborated circumstances,
based on its interpretation of the Court’s holding in Terry.82 Some
courts have interpreted Terry as holding that “an officer who reasonably suspects that a detainee is armed may conduct a frisk or take
other protective measures even in the absence of probable cause.”83
In Shuler, however, the court held that “[t]he officer must have
knowledge of some fact or circumstance that supports a reasonable
suspicion that the suspect is armed or poses a threat to safety.”84 This
73

Id.
Id.
75
De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 565.
76
Id. at 570.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
949 N.Y.S.2d 758 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2012).
80
Id. at 760.
81
Id. (quoting People v. Martinez, 606 N.E.2d 951, 953 (N.Y. 1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Schuler, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 760 (quoting People v. Batista, 672 N.E.2d 581, 583 (N.Y.
74
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is a narrow interpretation of reasonable suspicion because the court
provided specific factors that can raise a reasonable suspicion of danger, which include “the substance and reliability of the report that
brought the officers to the scene, the nature of the crime that the police are investigating, the suspect’s behavior and the shape, size, and
location of any bulges in the suspect’s clothing.”85 The court held
that this intrusion was reasonable under the circumstances because it
was minimal and limited in scope.86
C.

Facts or Circumstances that Support a Reasonable
Suspicion

In People v. Stevenson, the court held that a noticeable bulge
in the suspect’s waistband and the suspect’s refusal to answer the police officer’s questions did not justify a frisk of the suspect. 87 In Stevenson, a detective was inside an unmarked vehicle when he noticed
the defendant walk by.88 The detective noticed a bulge in the defendant’s waistband and observed him adjusting the area of his clothing
where the bulge was located several times.89 The detective subsequently detained the defendant and frisked his person.90
With exception to the bulge in the suspect’s waistband, the
court alluded to the fact that there were no other circumstances to
suggest that the suspect posed a threat to the police officer or that
criminal activity was afoot.91 On the other hand, the detective was
justified to question the suspect because he noticed the bulge in his
clothing.92 The subsequent frisk, however, was not justified because
the suspect had the right to refuse the police officer’s questions.93
Even though the officer found a gun on the suspect, the evidence was
suppressed because there was no reasonable suspicion of dangerous
activity.94
1996)); People v. Davenport, 939 N.Y.S.2d 473, 475 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2004); Stevenson,
779 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
85
Schuler, 949 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
86
Id.
87
Stevenson, 779 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Stevenson, 779 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
93
Id.
94
Id.
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Although the aforementioned facts of Stevenson did not constitute a justifiable frisk, there are many instances where New York
courts have upheld the constitutionality of an officer’s frisk. It is
worth noting, however, that the common circumstance in these cases
is that the frisking officer responded to a police call of gun shots or
other criminal activity.95 Courts often require corroborated evidence
to justify a police officer’s finding of reasonable suspicion in order to
conduct a frisk during a street encounter.96
For example, in People v. Davenport,97 police officers responded to a reported gun shot at a specific location.98 The police officers made a timely arrival to the scene and noticed the defendant
walking with his hand placed on his waistband.99 The officers also
noted that the defendant looked nervous as he was swiftly looking in
multiple directions.100 After the defendant noticed the officer, he
slowly retreated.101 In response, the officer frisked the defendant’s
waistband and recovered a loaded firearm.102 Considering the “totality of the circumstances,” the court found that the officer was justified
in conducting a limited intrusion of the defendant’s person.103
A corroboration of evidence involving gunshots and a defendant’s suspicious actions occurred in People v. Warren.104 In Warren,
the officer heard gunshots and investigated the area from which the
sounds were coming.105 The officer observed defendant “tugging on
an object in his waistband” and asked defendant to show his hands.106
95

See, e.g., People v. Benjamin, 414 N.E.2d 645, 647 (N.Y. 1980) (“an anonymous tip of
‘men with guns’, standing alone, does not justify intrusive police action, and certainly does
not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion warranting a stop and frisk.”); see also People v.
Celaj, 760 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding that an anonymous tip of men with weapons supported by other factors such as temporal proximity, suspect descriptions, and a bulge
on the suspect’s waistband can justify a frisk); Davenport, 939 N.Y.S.2d 475-76 (holding
that an officer responding to a report of gunshots may conduct a frisk when he observes articulable facts and makes rational inferences that suggest the suspect is a threat to his or the
public’s safety).
96
People v. Lopez, 864 N.Y.S.2d 696, 704 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
97
939 N.Y.S.2d 473.
98
Id. at 474.
99
Id. at 475.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Davenport, 939 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
103
Id. at 476.
104
613 N.Y.S.2d 375 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994).
105
Id.
106
Id.
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The defendant complied after the officer’s third request, and the officer proceeded to pat him down.107 The officer recovered a firearm
from the defendant’s waistband.108 The court held that the officer
was justified in approaching defendant from his initial observations.109 Furthermore, given the sound of gun shots and the defendant’s suspicious actions, the officer had a valid concern for his safety;
therefore, the frisk was justified.110
V.

INDIRECT RACIAL PROFILING

The unjustified frisk in Kennebrew implicated issues of indirect racial profiling. The police based their suspicions of danger off
of the defendant’s clothing and tattoo. Studies have been conducted
in recent times showing that this type of police work is the product of
indirect racial profiling.111 Most notably, similar issues to the ones
raised in Kennebrew have been raised in New York City in recent
times.
A.

Floyd v. City of New York

On August 12, 2013, United States District Court Judge Shira
Scheindlin filed a memorandum of her ruling in Floyd v. City of New
York.112 Floyd involved a class action suit against the city of New
York for violations of the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.113 This case was monumental for New York City because Judge Scheindlin’s ruling declared NYPD’s “stop and frisk” practices unconstitutional.114 Judge
Scheindlin indicated that the police force was practicing indirect ra107

Id. at 375-76.
Id. at 376.
109
Warren, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
110
Id.
111
See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s
“Stop and Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 120 J. AM. STATISTICAL
ASS’N 813 (Sept. 2007), http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/frisk9.pdf;
The New York Police Department’s “Stop and Frisk” Practices: A Report to the People of
the State of New York from the Office of the Attorney General; Delores Jones-Brown et al.,
Stop, Question & Frisk Policing Practices in New York City: A Primer 9 (2010), available at
http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/web_images/PRIMER_electronic_version.pdf.
112
959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
113
Id. at 671.
114
Id.
108
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cial profiling, blatantly disregarding the protections of the Fourth
Amendment and that the city’s highest officials were ignoring the police force’s discriminatory practices.115
B.

Statistical Evidence of Unlawful Stops

The plaintiffs in Floyd relied heavily on expert testimony
from Jeffrey Fagan, a Columbia University professor who conducted
a study on the NYPD’s stop and frisk practices.116 Judge Scheindlin,
as the fact finder at trial, deemed Fagan’s testimony to be credible.117
In an eight and one half year span, from January 2004 to June 2012,
the NYPD recorded over 4.4 million “stops,” and more than half of
those stops resulted in a subsequent frisk for weapons.118 Even more
surprising than that staggering figure, those 2.3 million frisks resulted
in a 98.5% failure rate.119 In other words, police officers only found a
weapon 1.5% of the time they conducted stop and frisks in that time
frame.120 Furthermore, only 12% of those stops resulted in either an
arrest or a summons.121
Perhaps even more concerning than the failure rate of the
NYPD’s stop and frisks from 2004 through 2012 is the evidence of
racial profiling. “In 52% of the 4.4 million stops, the person stopped
was black, in 31% the person was Hispanic, and in 10% the person
was white.”122 Also, the police records reflect that officers used force
in 23% of the stops involving blacks, 24% of the stops involving
Hispanics, and 17% of the stops involving whites.123 One may argue
that this disparity can be attributed to more frequent possession of
weapons among those minority groups; however, police seized a
higher percentage of weapons from stopping whites than blacks or
Hispanics.124 Lastly, it is alarming that “[f]or the period 2004
through 2009, when any law enforcement action was taken following
a stop, blacks were 30% more likely to be arrested (as opposed to re115
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ceiving a summons) than whites, for the same suspected crime.”125
C.

Options and Obstacles for Reform

The overarching question courts are faced with when implementing reform is whether there is a greater duty to protect public
safety given the prosecutions resulting from the ‘stop and frisk’ practices or to protect the unalienable rights set forth in the Fourth
Amendment. Generally, it is difficult for courts to efficiently review
the actions of police officers when dealing with stop and frisks.
Police officers in New York City are required to fill out a
“UF-250” form when they conduct a stop and frisk.126 Before Floyd,
the UF-250 form required the officer to check off boxes, in reference
to the reasons for the stop and frisk.127 By merely checking off boxes, officers were given opportunities to justify a ‘stop and frisk’ when
there was no real legal justification.128 These boxes contain vague
descriptions that can easily be justified in most situations, for example, “Area Has High Incidence of Reported Offenses of Type Under
Investigation,” “Furtive Movements,” and “Inappropriate Attire.”129
To remedy this potential injustice, the court in Floyd held that the
UF-250 form must be revised to contain a new section in which the
officer is required to record, in his or her own words, the legal justification for the stop.130 This revision of the form will implement stricter requirements for officers to make a stop and the subsequent documentation will allow courts to more accurately evaluate the
constitutionality of the stop, should a future issue arise.131 Susan
Hutson, an independent monitor of the New Orleans Police Department, noted that most experts believe that implementing a requirement for officers to provide a detailed narrative would be the most
optimal way to gather information for judicial review and, in turn,
125

Id. at 560.
Floyd, 283 F.R.D. at 163.
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131
Id.
126

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol30/iss4/11

14

Fernan: Search and Seizures

2014]

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

1067

prevent racial biases.132 Additionally, New York City officials have
expressed concern over the discriminatory issues arising out of the
City’s stop and frisk policy.133 In fact, twenty-seven of the fifty-one
members of the New York City Council filed an amicus brief, which
emphasized the rising distrust between minority groups and the
NYPD as well as the reinforcement of racial stereotypes.134
A huge obstacle to implementing efficient reform is the fact
that “frisking” is largely unreviewable, both judicially and administratively.135 The Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) is the
administrative body to which a civilian may file a complaint of an unlawful stop and frisk.136 Thirty percent of the claims filed with the
CCRB are a result of a claim to unlawful police practices during a
stop and frisk.137 A major problem with this process is that the
CCRB dismisses all cases in which the complainant cannot be
reached or refused to answer questions, which results in a dismissal
of about sixty-five percent of these complaints.138 Even if the complaint survived as one of the few cases that were substantiated by the
CCRB, the complaint is then turned over to the complete discretion
of the NYPD Commissioner.139
Statistics show that the NYPD Commissioner engaged in suspect practices when reviewing the substantiated cases.140 “The
NYPD is notorious for dismissing substantiated complaints without
taking action; in 2009, the NYPD declined to prosecute 30% to 40%
of cases referred to it as substantiated by the CCRB.”141 To remedy
this apparent injustice, an “Administrative Prosecutions Unit” was
created, but the only attorney employed on this unit left his position
in 2011 and has not been replaced.142
In addition to the administrative obstacles, a complainant is
132
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also faced with the doctrine of qualified immunity, which serves as a
major protection for police officers.143 Under this doctrine, police officers are immune from liability for money damages in suits brought
against them in their individual capacities if their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known. Police officers’ actions are
evaluated by an objectively reasonable standard, determining whether
the officer believed his or her actions to be lawful when the stop and
frisk occurred.144
Ultimately, when one’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated
as a result of a stop and frisk, the best remedy one can hope for is the
suppression of evidence, granted that some form of evidence was recovered. The suppression of evidence can be remedial at trial, but
statistics show that an overwhelming majority of stop and frisks do
not result in an arrest.145 Given the inapplicability of suppressing evidence for many complainants coupled with the obstacles to administrative action, it is unlikely that one can enjoy any remedial measure
after being victimized by an unlawful stop and frisk.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The issues arising out of Kennebrew and New York City in
general are ubiquitous and frequent.
Although defendant in
Kennebrew succeeded in suppressing the evidence against him, the
lack of reasonable suspicion implicated evidence of racial profiling.
Thousands of New Yorkers are stopped, questioned, and frisked annually. The Attorney General of New York recognized the issues
arising out of the stop and frisk policies and even expressed that this
is “the most serious civil rights issue . . . facing the city.”146 It is imperative to implement reform in order to avoid racial discrimination
within the criminal justice system. As demonstrated in Kennebrew, it
is unjust to intrude on citizens’ rights to privacy based on racial as143
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sumptions. The fact that defendant had a traditional gang tattoo and
wore gang colors may be unsettling for a police officer, but it certainly does not justify an unwarranted frisk. These basic principles are
inherent in the Framers’ language and intentions in both the United
States and New York constitutions. Police officers should be subjected to more intensive training in stop and frisk procedures and they
should be held to a higher standard of accountability within the judicial system. Judicial review of this accountability is imperative to
give legitimacy to these reforms as well. If substantive changes are
not efficiently executed, discriminatory police practices will inevitably continue and there will be injustice, therefore, will continue to
plague the criminal justice system. Ultimately, as the New York
Times effectively conveyed, “[t]he idea of universal suspicion without individual evidence is what Americans find abhorrent and what
black men in America must constantly fight. It is pervasive in policing policies—like stop-and-frisk . . . regardless of the collateral damage done to the majority of innocents. It’s like burning down a house
to rid it of mice.”147
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